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Abstract: Religious intolerance and bigotry indeed is a 
contributing factor in social and political conflict including 
manifestations of terrorist violence. While freedom of 
religion is enshrined in Indonesia’s Constitution, social 
practices and governmental regulations fall short of 
constitutional and international law guarantees, allowing 
institutionalised bias in the treatment of religious 
minorities. Such bias inhibits Indonesia’s transition to a 
fully-functioning pluralistic democracy and sacrifices 
democratic ideals of personal liberty and freedom of 
expression for the stated goals of religious and social 
harmony. The Ahok case precisely confirms that. The 
paper examines the constitutional bases of freedom of 
religion, Indonesia’s Blasphemy Law and takes account of 
the history and tenets of Pancasila which dictate a belief in 
God as the first principle of state ideology. The paper 
argues that the Indonesian state’s failure to recognise the 
legitimacy of alternate theological positions is a major 
obstacle to Indonesia recognising the ultimate ideal, 
enshrined in the national motto, of unity in diversity.  
Keywords: freedom of religion, violence, intolerance, 
constitution. 
Introduction  
This field of inquiry is where philosophy, religion, politics, 
terrorism–even scientific method–all converge in the arena of current 
                                                 
1 Based on a paper presented at the International Indonesia Forum IX, 23-24 August 
2016 Atma Jaya Catholic University, Jakarta. 
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world events. It is an area of utmost importance, as it deals with what 
is arguably the greatest challenge facing humanity; the pursuit of 
peaceful coexistence with other members of our species. Our 
collective failure to resolve this challenge may ultimately result in an 
increasingly catastrophic descent into global conflict.  
This paper takes a multi-disciplinary approach to analysing issues 
relating to freedom of religion and intolerance as contributors to social 
conflict and terrorist violence. The paper combines philosophical, 
historical, communications theory, legal and political elements in the 
discussion, which focuses, primarily, on the situation as it currently 
exists in Indonesia. While much of the discussion centres on 
Indonesia, the ideas and arguments presented may apply more widely. 
The paper begins by citing various philosophical thinkers to argue for 
an “unaccustomed shift” in critical thinking; to challenge our own 
most fundamental beliefs. It argues that this approach can be used to 
support a meta-narrative of political secularism which may be a vital 
key to success in terrorism counter-ideology. The paper then examines 
and analyses a number of historical, constitutional and legal issues 
currently existing in Indonesia which influence and shape prevailing 
attitudes toward religious freedom and religious ‘deviancy’ or 
blasphemy. The paper concludes that a growing religious orthodoxy in 
Indonesia, supported by legislative frameworks, reacts strongly against 
ideologies which are considered to be outside the mainstream, severely 
inhibiting the religious or general freedom of thought required to 
challenge received ‘wisdom’ and to encourage innovation of ideas.  
Why Indonesia? 
It may reasonably be asked what relevance the Indonesian situation 
has to the rest of the world, and why Indonesia is worthy of attention 
in discussions on the topic of religious intolerance and terrorist 
violence. Indonesia has not only experienced its share of jihadist 
terrorism,2 its state responses to terrorism have reaped considerable 
results.3 It is often stated that Indonesia, can serve as a model of 
                                                 
2 For in-depth analysis of Indonesian terrorism issues see: www.understan-
dingconflict.org.  
3 Hannah Beech, 'What Indonesia Can Teach the World About Counterterrorism' 
(2010)  TIME  <http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,1992246,00.-
html#ixzz1THb0itBv>. 
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‘moderate’ Islam for the rest of the Muslim world.4 In February 2016, 
US President Barack Obama stated that his administration wanted to 
“partner” with Indonesia because it represents “the best of moderate 
Islam...their voice is absolutely critical in us winning the larger 
ideological battle that ISIS has mounted.”5  
Governments, academics, religious leaders, even radical terrorist 
groups, all agree on one thing: ideology is important.6 Countering the 
radical ideology of terrorist groups, is a crucial step in defeating them; 
it is a war of words and ideology, and one of the main battlefields is in 
online forums–the ‘town halls of the digital age’.7 The counter-
ideology recommended in this paper is one which recognises a global 
humanity and humanism, which challenges any form of accepted 
traditional ‘knowledge’ including religion, and challenges limitations on 
freedom of thought–whether those limitations are imposed by 
governments or by religion. The paper argues that the most effective 
response to Islamist extremism, is to depoliticise Islam through a 
“metanarrative of political secularism”8–that is, a counter-ideology 
                                                 
4 Kamaruddin Amin, 'Can Indonesian Islam be a Model for the Rest of the Muslim 
World?' (2016)  The Jakarta Post  <http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2016-
/05/20/can-indonesian-islam-be-a-model-for-the-rest-of-the-muslim-world.html>. 
5 Lin Xueling, 'Exclusive: We want to partner ASEAN countries that represent best of 
moderate Islam, says Obama' (2016)  Channel News Asia  <http://www.channel-
newsasia.com/news/asiapacific/exclusive-we-want-to/2533520.html> 
6 Mark Sedgwick, 'Jihadist ideology, Western counter-ideology, and the ABC model' 
(2012) 5(3) Critical Studies on Terrorism 359; Jacob Silverman, 'That Propaganda Program 
Bill Clinton Praised Hillary for? It Was Considered a Failure.' (2016)  Politico Magazine  
<http://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2016/07/bill-clinton-hillary-clinton-
counter-messaging-radicalization-islamists-214112> 
7 Deen Freelon et al, 'Town Halls of the Digital Age: Controversy and Ideology in 
Online Deliberation (and Beyond)' (2008) October 16-18, 2008(Paper ID: 238) Internet 
Research 9.0 IT University of Copenhagen  
8 Halim Rane, 'Narratives and Counter-narratives of Islamist Extremism' in Anne Aly 
et al (eds), Violent Extremism Online: New Persectives on Terrorism and the Internet 
(Routledge, 2016) Rane notes “Studies that profile dozens of Muslim terrorism 
suspects in Europe (Rabasa and Benard 2015) and Australia (Bergin et. al. 2015) show 
that while some commence a university or diploma or degree, many drop out and do 
not obtain post-secondary school qualifications. Moreover, it is noteworthy that none 
of the suspects listed possess a humanities or social science degree. Those with tertiary 
qualifications tend to be trained in information technology, business, finance, 
engineering and science... A humanities or social science education may allow young 
Muslims to better understand history, society, religion and international relations 
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emphasising freedom of thought, political expression and scientific 
inquiry, social justice as well as the “values of democracy, rule of law, 
equality of opportunity, and freedom from persecution”.9 
As the largest Muslim-majority country, the third largest 
democracy, and the fourth most populous country in the world, what 
happens in Indonesia matters. Indonesian attitudes and practices with 
regard to issues like religion, terrorism, and the implementation of 
Shariah law, can influence global thinking and direction on these 
important issues.  
While some of the discussion in this paper, particularly with 
reference to Indonesia’s Constitution and state philosophy therefore 
do not directly apply to other countries, some of the arguments do 
apply more broadly. A bigot who does not tolerate conflicting points 
of view, whether Christian, Muslim, atheist or any other ideology, 
displays the same intolerance whether they are in Indonesia, the US, or 
elsewhere. This paper does not advocate atheism, agnosticism, 
communism or any other ‘ism’. It advocates freedom of political and 
religious expression to allow a rational conversation and debate about 
these topics to occur in public fora – and is opposed to the blanket 
prohibition, and in some cases criminalisation, of discussions of such 
topics.    
On Doubt 
Philosopher and ethicist Peter Singer made the case for a radical 
change to human attitudes and practices by pointing out the need to 
occasionally “re-think” our own fundamental beliefs – even those 
which are the most “natural and inevitable”. In 1990, he wrote:  
In recent years a number of oppressed groups have campaigned 
vigorously for equality. The classic instance is the Black Liberation 
movement, which demands an end to the prejudice and 
discrimination that has made blacks second-class citizens. The 
immediate appeal of the black liberation movement and its initial, 
if limited, success made it a model for other oppressed groups to 
follow. We became familiar with liberation movements for 
Spanish-Americans, gay people, and a variety of other minorities. 
                                                                                                      
which may enable them to not only resist and reject Islamist ideology and narratives, 
but to develop counter-narratives and a Western Muslim identity for the benefit of 
their community.” 
9 Sedgwick, above n  
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When a majority group–women–began their campaign, some 
thought we had come to the end of the road. Discrimination on 
the basis of sex, it has been said, is the last universally accepted 
form of discrimination, practiced without secrecy or pretense even 
in those liberal circles that have long prided themselves on their 
freedom from prejudice against racial minorities.  
One should always be wary of talking of “the last remaining form 
of discrimination.” If we have learnt anything from the liberation 
movements, we should have learnt how difficult it is to be aware 
of latent prejudice in our attitudes to particular groups until this 
prejudice is forcefully pointed out. 
A liberation movement demands an expansion of our moral 
horizons and an extension or reinterpretation of the basic moral 
principle of equality. Practices that were previously regarded as 
natural and inevitable come to be seen as the result of unjustifiable 
prejudice. Who can say with confidence that all his or her attitudes 
and practices are beyond criticism? If we wish to avoid being 
numbered among the oppressors, we must be prepared to re-think 
even our most fundamental attitudes. We need to consider them 
from the point of view of those most disadvantaged by our 
attitudes, and the practices that follow from these attitudes. If we 
can make this unaccustomed mental switch we may discover a 
pattern in our attitudes and practices that consistently operates so 
as to benefit one group–usually the one to which we ourselves 
belong–at the expense of another.10  
The “latent prejudice” discussed in this paper, is not that of 
humans toward non-humans, as Singer argued, it is that of the religious 
toward the non-religious, or the religious-other. The “unaccustomed 
mental switch” which must be made, is for religious people, to 
consider that their most fundamental attitude of faith in a particular 
religion may “number them among the oppressors”. As Singer also 
stated, “All this may sound a little far-fetched, more like a parody of 
other liberation movements than a serious objective.”  
To religious people, particularly those belonging to Indonesia’s 
Muslim majority, it may seem like a joke, until we consider that in 
2012, an Indonesian man, Alexander Aan, was sentenced to two and a 
half years imprisonment for stating on his Facebook page that he was 
                                                 
10 Peter Singer, 'All Animals Are Equal ' in Tom Regan and Peter Singer (eds), Animal 
Rights and Human Obligations (Prentice Hall, Second ed, 1989), p. 148. 
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an atheist.11 Acts of extreme violence against followers of the minority 
Ahmadiyah Islamic sect are well documented in Indonesia.12 
Governmental practices of granting, withholding or cancelling, 
building permits for non-majority places of worship indicate serious 
insitutionalised bias in, particularly, Indonesia’s provincial and local 
governments.13 Widespread anti-LGBT stances, largely driven by 
religious views, have led to institutionalised prejudice in political, 
religious and medical institutions–notably the promulgation of local 
bylaws which criminalise homosexuality and the categorisation of 
homosexuality as a mental illness.14  The last and still lingering case is 
Ahok blasphemy case.15  
Makin points out that while Indonesia’s “wonderful” diversity is 
often referred to when promoting Indonesia to the world as a travel 
destination, pluralism of religion has been consistently denied by 
                                                 
11 Joe Cochrane, 'Embrace of Atheism Put an Indonesian in Prison' (2014)  New York 
Times <http://www.nytimes.com/2014/05/04/world/asia/indonesian-who-embrace-
d-atheism-landed-in-prison.html> 
12 Niniek Karmini, 'No Shame for Religious Killings in Indonesian Town', The Jakarta 
Globe August 09, 2011 2011 <http://www.thejakartaglobe.com/home/no-shame-for-
religious-killings-in-indonesian-town/458163> 
13 Melissa Crouch, 'Implementing the Regulation on Places of Worship in Indonesia: 
New Problems, Local Politics and Court Action' (2010) 34 Asian Studies Review 403. 
14 Jamison Liang and IA, 'Morality and LGBT rights in Indonesia ' (2016)  New 
Mandala  <http://www.newmandala.org/morality-and-lgbt-rights-in-indonesia/> 
15 The case began with a viral video showing Ahok (Basuki Cahaya Purnama) the 
governor of Jakarta who happens to be a Chinese descent and non-Muslim 
complaining the use of Qur’anic verse (5:51) by certain conservative Muslim clerics to 
urge Muslim community in Jakarta for not to vote him the 2017 upcoming governor 
election.  The governor speech was on 27 of September 2016 then he was reported to 
police by Habib Novel Hasan on 6 of November 2016, a conservative Muslim cleric of 
Front of Islam’s Defender (Front Pembela Islam; FPI). Huge Muslim masses rallied in 
Jakarta on 4 of November demanding Ahok prosecution for blasphemy and on 16 of 
November 2016 the police named Ahok as suspect. Another conservative mass rally 
took place in Jakarta on 2 of December 2016 to further reinforce conservative stance. 
See for instance: Timeline of Ahok Case, Pressreader,  https://www.pressreader.com/-
indonesia/the-jakarta-post/20161107/281547995456899 and Indonesia: Drop blas-
phemy case against Jakarta Governor, Amnesty International, https://www.amnesty.-
org/en/latest/news/ 2016/11/indonesia-drop-case-against-jakarta-governor/  
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successive governments since Soekarno.16 He notes the irony that 
“imported” religions such as Islam, Buddhism and Christianity are 
acknowledged by the government, whereas the existence of indigenous 
religions is denied; and leaders and followers of ‘deviant’ sects often 
face prosecution and imprisonment under the Blasphemy Law of 
1965.17 In Makin’s analysis, this is the result of “the growing pressure 
of Islamic orthodoxy which often shows its muscle to control political 
and social dimensions”.18 
A religious reader may object at this point, and say “Yes, but just 
because I hold strong religious views does not mean that I, or any 
religious person, will commit acts of bigotry or violence!” This is, of 
course, correct. However, in response I would raise two points. First, 
that religious self righteousness allows little space to consider the 
validity of attitudes or practices which conflict with the view of the 
religious believer. And, that in the minds of some individuals and 
groups in Indonesia, this provides the justification needed to 
participate in vigilante activities such as ‘anti-vice’ raids, and these have 
been shown to be a pre-cursor to more serious violent actions, 
including terrorist attacks.19 For some, not all, religious people, the 
sense of unassailable correctness which stems from religious piety, is a 
slippery slope into bigotry and violence.  
Second, on a far more fundamental level, religions are a means of 
dividing people. Religions are a very efficient means of allowing people 
to say, on a very deep level, ‘I am this, and you are that’ or ‘You are 
different from me–you are the other’. Even the most tolerant religious 
people must acknowledge that, on a very fundamental ideological level, 
their religion defines them as something different to people of other 
religions (or those of no religion) and, conversely, that they share a 
special bond of identity with people of the same religion. This inherent 
divisiveness is perhaps religion’s greatest obstacle to facilitating peace 
within humanity.  
                                                 
16 Al Makin, 'Plurality Denied: the defeat of pluralism advocates in Indonesia during 
the reformation era' (2012)  (5 November 2012) Conference on Negotiating Diversity in 
Indonesia, School of Social Sciences Management University, Singapore November 5-6, 2012  
17 Ibid., p. 4. 
18 Ibid., p. 3. 
19 ICG, 'Indonesia: From Vigilantism to Terrorism in Cirebon' (International Crisis 
Group, 26 January 2012 2012) 
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It may also be stated that, of the almost-daily acts of terrorist 
violence which occur throughout the world, all of them, by definition, 
are committed by individuals who believe in the truthfulness or 
correctness of their religious or ideological beliefs. Defining terrorism 
is an enormously complex area of academic discourse.20 However, 
most definitions of terrorism include a “political, religious or 
ideological” component. Therefore, by definition, anyone who 
commits a terrorist act, is willing to kill or cause serious injury to 
others, because of their unshakeable conviction in an ideological cause 
of one sort or another. In that sense, absolute belief, or fanaticism, 
about any ideology, religious or secular, is dangerous. It is precisely this 
notion of unshakeable conviction which this paper seeks to shake.  
In 1933, philosopher Bertrand Russell wrote an essay titled “The 
Triumph of Stupidity” that analysed the rise of the Nazi movement in 
Germany. He wrote:  
The fundamental cause of the trouble is that in the modern world 
the stupid are cocksure while the intelligent are full of doubt.21 
The quote was later paraphrased to: “the whole problem with the 
world is that fools and fanatics are always so sure of themselves and 
wiser people so full of doubt.”22 Along a similar line, the 17th century 
philosopher Voltaire, stated “those who can make you believe 
absurdities can make you commit attrocities”.23 Statements such as 
these are particularly relevant in the post-9/11 context of terrorism, 
particularly acts of suicide terrorism. Motivations of suicide bombers 
may be diverse, but there is no question that many, if not most, of the 
individual actors in what David Rapoport called “the current wave of 
                                                 
20 See for example: Alex Schmid, 'Terrorism - the Definitional Problem' (2004) 36(2/3) 
Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law 375; Joshua Sinai, 'How to Define 
Terrorism. ' (2010) 2(4) (November 2010) Perspectives on Terrorism  
21 Bertrand Russell, 'The Triumph of Stupidity' in Bertrand Russell (ed), Mortals and 
Others (Taylor & Francis, 1933) 203 Russell also noted that lack of doubt of ideological 
fanatics may lead to dangerous consequences stating: “fanaticism is the gravest danger 
there is; I might almost say that I was fanatical against fanaticism” (emphasis added). 
Bob Lewis, 'A Word a Day IS Survival Guide ' (2001) 23(4) InfoWorld  
22 Lewis, above n  
23 Voltaire, Questions sur les Miracles a M. Claparede. 
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religious terrorism”24–as compared with the preceding waves of 
Anarchist, Anti-colonialist and New Left terrorism–are motivated by 
their strong religious beliefs.  
Renaissance philosopher Rene Descartes, in his 1637 Discourse on 
the Method, 25 began his philosophical enquiry by observing that our 
intellect and our senses can lead us into error, and therefore doubted 
the existence of everything, before finally concluding that we cannot 
doubt of our own existence while we doubt. He concluded “I think, 
therefore I am”. Descartes’ exposition of sceptical doubt, signalled the 
birth of scientific method as a means of attaining knowledge; as distinct 
from beliefs which are received through other means such as tradition, 
authority or revelation. 
In discussing tradition, authority and revelation as reasons for 
believing, Richard Dawkins wrote: 
Tradition means beliefs handed down from grandparent to parent 
to child, and so on. Or from books handed down through the 
centuries. Traditional beliefs often start from almost nothing; 
perhaps somebody just makes them up originally, like the stories 
about Thor and Zeus. But after they’ve been handed down over 
some centuries, the mere fact that they are old makes them seem 
special. People believe things simply because people have believed 
the same thing over centuries. That’s tradition.  
The trouble with tradition is that, no matter how long ago a story 
was made up, it is still exactly as true or untrue as the original 
story was. If you make up a story that isn’t true, handing it down 
over any number of centuries doesn’t make it any truer!26  
Dawkins similarly dismisses ‘authority’ and ‘religious revelation’ as 
unreliable sources of ‘knowledge’.  
When religious people just have a feeling inside themselves that 
something is true, they call their feeling ‘revelation’. It isn’t only 
                                                 
24 David Rapoport, 'The Four Waves of Rebel Terror and September 11 ' (2002) 8 (1 
Spring/Summer 2002) (2002) Anthropoetics - the Journal of Generative Anthropology  
25 Veitch, John (1850). Discourse on the Method of Rightly Conducting the Reason, 
and Seeking Truth in the Sciences, by Descartes. Edinburgh: Sutherland and Knox. 
p. 74. 
26 For a discussion of “tradition, authority and revelation” as sources of unreliable 
beliefs see: Richard Dawkins, A Devil's Chaplain: Reflections on Hope, Lies, Science, and Love 
(Mariner Books, 2003) Chapter 7.1 Good and Bad Reasons for Believing pp 242-249. 
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popes who claim to have revelations. Lots of religious people do. 
It is one of their main reasons for believing the things that they do 
believe. But is it a good reason? ... An inside ‘feeling’ on its own is 
not a good reason for believing ... You need evidence.27 
Indonesia and Freedom of Religion 
Indonesia has achieved great advances in freedom of expression 
and the media in the almost two decades since the fall of President 
Soeharto, and the subsequent era of reformasi. Public criticism of 
governmental processes and policy which would have been 
unthinkable under the Soeharto regime is now commonplace.28 
However, despite this loosening of restrictions on public and media 
commentary, there are two main areas which remain taboo in 
Indonesian public discourse: atheism and communism–both of which 
are ideologically linked, and feared, in the minds of many 
Indonesians,29 even though left-flavored publication aspecially in 
campus circle started to flourish.  
In a country where freedom of political expression, and freedom 
of religion, are both enshrined in the Constitution, it may be asked 
what historical and socio-political factors led to the widespread 
rejection and fear of alternative secular ideologies such as communism 
and atheism. The answer lies in Indonesia’s unique history; Soekarno’s 
formulation of the national philosophy of Pancasila, the Constitution 
and its subsequent amendments, a law on blasphemy from the mid-
1960s, and US-sponsored anti-communist purges which also occurred 
in the mid-1960s and led to the rise of Soeharto’s ‘New Order’ 
government.  
 
 
 
                                                 
27 Ibid., p. 245. 
28 Kikue Hamayotsu, 'The Limits of Civil Society in Democratic Indonesia: Media 
Freedom and Religious Intolerance' (2013) 43(4) Journal of Contemporary Asia 658 The 
article notes that the rise of media freedom has also led to greater dissemination of 
intolerant views of conservative religious leaders. 
29 Ken Setiawan, 'The fear of communism still haunts Indonesia' (2016)  Indonesia at 
Melbourne  <http://indonesiaatmelbourne.unimelb.edu.au/belok-kiri-fest-fear-of-com-
munism-still-haunts-indonesia/>; Randy Fabi and Kanupriya Kapoor, 'Indonesia's 'red 
scare' stokes unease over military's growing influence' (2016)  Reuters  
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The Pancasila 
Despite frequent inaccurate media reports, Indonesia is not the 
world’s largest Muslim country30-because Indonesia is not a Muslim 
country. It  has the largest population of Muslim inhabitants, however, 
the philosophical foundation of the nation is not Islam, it is the 
Pancasila. The Pancasila is not of ‘divine’ origin. It was very clearly 
formulated by Indonesia’s founding president Soekarno  prior to the 
end of World War II, in June 1945.31 Indonesia declared Independence 
on 17 August 1945.  
The Pancasila is taught to all Indonesian children in elementary 
school.32 It is learnt by rote and takes on the qualities of a mantra. It 
derives its name by joining two Sanskrit words: panca meaning five and 
sila meaning principle. The first sila, as any Indonesian can tell you, is 
Ketuhanan Yang Maha Esa – Belief in the one and only God. For 
completeness, the other five principles are listed here, but this 
discussion will be concerned primarily with the first principle.33  
Soekarno dedicated an entire speech to how he formulated the 
philosophische grondslag or weltanschauung of the embryonic Republic of 
Indonesia. The word weltanschauung appears over twenty times in the 
speech, as Soekarno describes the philosophical foundations of other 
countries, such as the National-Socialist doctrine of Hitler’s Nazi 
Germany in 1933; Lenin’s use of Marxism as the national ideology of 
Soviet Russia in 1917; and how Ibn Saud established the nation of 
Arabia on the weltanschauung of a religion, Islam. He also referred to the 
                                                 
30 See for example: Ishan Tharoor, 'The world’s largest Muslim country bans support 
for the Islamic State' (2014)  The Washington Post  <http://www.washingtonpost-
.com/blogs/worldviews/wp/2014/08/07/the-worlds-largest-muslim-country-bans-
support-for-the-islamic-state/> 
31 Tino Saroengallo and Tyo Pakusadewo, Pantja-Sila Cita-Cita & Realita A Historical 
Documentary Film (2016)  
32 In theoretical terms taken from the field of intercultural communications, cultural 
norms learned at an early age, known as ‘basic assumptions’, are among the deepest 
and most influential shapers of how individuals perceive the world around them, and 
in most cases individuals themselves are “unaware of their influence”. Carlos Nunez, 
Raya Nunez Mahdi and Laura Popma, Intercultural Sensitivity: from denial to intercultural 
competence (Third Edition ed, 2014), 15.  
33 (1) Belief in the one and only God, (2) Just and civilised humanity, (3) The unity of 
Indonesia, (4) Democracy guided by the inner wisdom in the unanimity arising out of 
deliberations amongst representatives, (5) Social justice for all of the people of 
Indonesia.  
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Chinese San Min Chu I or Three Principles of Sun Yat Sen, and the 
Tennoo Koodoo Seishin of Imperial Japan, as the founding 
philosophies of those nations. Soekarno acknowledged that Sun Yat 
Sen’s ideology of nationalism had had a particular impact on him.  
For Soekarno, the question of statehood was primarily concerned 
with seeking unifying elements. One unifying element upon which 
Indonesia could be established was the land and sea which clearly gave 
it its geological boundaries and united person with land. “Even a little 
child, if shown a map of the world, can show that the Indonesian 
archipelago itself is a single entity.34 The Indonesian nation, according 
to Soekarno was not just one part, such as the Minangkabau, or 
Yogyakarta, “but all islands directed by God to be a single entity 
between two continents and two oceans, that is our homeland.”35 The 
reasoning is therefore based on the geographical positioning of the 
islands of Indonesia from “Sumatra to Irian” as the uniting factor and 
Soekarno placed an emphasis on the fact that this “nationhood” had 
two historical precedents; that is, the Sriwijaya and Majapahit 
kingdoms which Soekarno considered to be nationale staat.  
Wishing to avoid national chauvinism Soekarno stated “we must 
advance toward world unity, a world of brotherhood.36 We do not only 
have to establish an independent state of Indonesia, but we must also 
move toward a family of nations. This, in fact, is my second 
principle”–the principle of ‘internationalism’ or ‘humanity’. Soekarno’s 
                                                 
34 Ibid., p. 95. 
35 Ibid., p. 98.  
36 The most radical idea contained in Soekarno’s Pancasila speech, is one which was 
briefly raised and immediately rejected. It is an idea that was well before its time, but 
one which may, in time, come to be recognised as the only legitimate option for 
humanity in order to overcome conflict between groups and states.  Soekarno stated “I 
do confess, when I was 16 years old, sitting in the H.B.S. school in Surabaya, I was 
influenced by a socialist named A. Baars, who taught me. He said: do not think in 
terms of nationality, but think of a global humanity, do not have the slightest thought 
of nationality. That happened in 1917. But in 1918, thank God, there was another who 
set me straight: Dr Sun Yat Sen, in his work San Min Chu I or The Three People’s 
Principles...from that moment, in my heart was planted a sense of nationhood, the 
effect of The Three People’s Principles.” Saroengallo and Pakusadewo, above n , 101. 
The idea of abolishing all nations, while utterly radical, offers an opportunity to 
remove barriers between human groups and acknowledge only the common bond of 
humanity and a single global identity, that is, the condition of being a human 
inhabitant of Earth.  
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third principle was ‘consensus’, ‘representation’ and ‘deliberation’, 
achieved through a representative body which would deliberate and 
achieve consensus. Soekarno saw this as the “best opportunity and 
place to nurture religion”.37 Hence, Islam as a founding principle of the 
state was expressly excluded, while recognising that if, through 
democratic representation, Islam was the will of the people then it 
would be achieved through a representative assembly. “Supposing the 
one hundred members of the People’s Representative Assembly work, 
work as had as possible, so that 60, 70, 80, 90 delegates who sit in the 
assembly are Muslims, so that the laws issuing from the House of 
Representatives are Islamic laws, too.”38  
Soekarno’s fourth sila was prosperity, which was a kind of 
compromise between Chinese Socialism and American Capitalism – 
deliberately eschewing Western capitalism he said “Gentlemen, I 
propose that if we seek democracy, it should not be a western 
democracy but a consensus that affirms life...that is capable of bringing 
social prosperity.” 
In formulating his fifth and final sila Soekarno stated:  
The fifth principle should be: build an independent Indonesia 
based on the submission to God Almighty. The Principle of 
Divinity. Not only an Indonesian nation that fears God, but each 
person should believe in God in his own way ... All people should 
believe according to their culture, without religious egoism ... Let 
us preach, practice our religion, whether Islam or Christianity, in a 
civilised manner. What is a civilised manner? It is respect: respect 
for one another.39 
In Soekarno’s original iteration of the Pancasila therefore, a belief 
in God was not the first principle of the state, or even the second, 
third or fourth. “Indonesian nationality”, the condition of being a 
member of the peoples inhabiting the islands of the archipelago, was 
the first principle. It was only with the later intervention of Islamic 
factions in the independence committee that Belief in God was moved 
from its position as the fifth sila, to the first position.40  
                                                 
37 Ibid., p. 103. 
38 Ibid.  
39 Ibid., p. 110.  
40 Along with moving Soekarno’s  fifth sila ‘Belief in God’ from fifth position to first 
position, the committee also altered the wording of the sila to make it compulsory for 
  
Adam J. Fenton 
JOURNAL OF INDONESIAN ISLAM 
Volume 10, Number 02, December 2016 
194 
It would be wrong to conclude that because belief in God was last 
on Soekarno’s list of five principles, that it was not important to him; it 
clearly was. However, it was also clearly not the predominant factor of 
Indonesian-ness. Soekarno discussed the relevance of the number five 
as being significant; five fingers, five senses, five pillars of Islam. 
However, he suggested that the five principles, could, if necessary, be 
condensed to three – which he listed as Socio-nationalism, Socio-
democracy, and Divinity – comprising, not a Pancasila, but a Trisila.  
Taking the notion of condensing even further, Soekarno 
postulated that if he were to condense all five silas to three, and three 
to one, it would be the principle of gotong-royong. Effort, contribution, 
work, pulling together, all religions, indigenous and other ancestries – 
an Ekasila, or Single Principle. Soekarno left it to the committee to 
determine which of the three: Panca Sila, Tri Sila or Eka Sila, would be 
chosen as the founding principle of the independent Indonesia. He 
said: 
Or perhaps there are those of you who do not like the number 
five? I can condense these principles from five to three... But 
perhaps not all of you gentlemen are happy with this Tri Sila, and 
ask for one, just one basic principle? Very well... If I condense the 
five to three, and the three becomes one, I arrive at a genuine 
Indonesian word: gotong royong... This, gentlemen is what I propose 
to you. Panca Sila became Tri Sila, Tri Sila became Eka Sila. But it 
is up to you gentlemen which to choose: Tri Sila, Eka Sila or 
Panca Sila? I have already explained the content.41 
It is therefore, by quirk of history that Indonesia has a Pancasila 
with its first tenet as a belief in God. If the Independence Committee 
had chosen Soekarno’s Ekasila as the weltanschauung of the new republic 
there would have been no mention of God whatsoever in Indonesia’s 
founding philosophy, and this could have drastically altered the 
                                                                                                      
Muslim Indonesians to adhere to Shariah law. In the second version of the pancasila, 
the first tenet therefore became: “Belief in God with the obligation for Muslims to 
adhere to Islamic law” – which became known as the ‘Jakarta Charter’. The ‘seven little 
words’ of the Jakarta Charter were “dropped at President Soekarno’s insistence as the 
Constitution was being finalised in 1945. This was in part because of fears that 
Christians in Eastern Indonesia would abandon the new Republic, and in part because 
of secular nationalist objection.” Tim Lindsey (ed), Indonesia: Law and Society 
(Federation Press, 2nd Edition ed, 2008) 41. 
41 Saroengallo above n p. 18, pp. 112-113. 
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nation’s history. The Pancasila underwent several revisions in 
subsequent years with slight alterations to the wording, but belief in an 
‘Almighty God’ or ‘Deity’ remained at the top of the list of five tenets 
– and generations of Indonesian children were indoctrinated in 
Indonesian schools to accept, without question, the existence of God 
as a fundamental belief, and a quality of their Indonesian-ness. A belief 
in God is therefore part of what it means to be Indonesian. 
One aspect of Soekarno’s Pancasila speech which is also relevant 
to this discussion, is that he was strongly opposed to bigotry or 
‘chauvinism’. He repeatedly stated that “Indonesia should be a nation 
where each person may worship their own God in their own way” – 
and stressed the need to “respect the beliefs of others”. He was 
likewise opposed to national chauvinism, and strongly in favour of a 
unified brotherhood of nations, of which Indonesia would form a part.  
While Soekarno considered himself a Muslim, he admitted his 
faults stating “a thousand apologies if my practice of Islam is far from 
perfect – but if you opened my chest, and saw I had a heart, 
gentlemen, you would find none other than a heart of Islam.” Clearly, 
Soekarno considered himself religious, and a Muslim, but his approach 
was not bigoted, or superior, or self-righteous; it was conciliatory, 
inclusive, respectful and tolerant – “we must advance toward world 
unity, a world of brotherhood”.42 What Soekarno did not explicitly 
address, was an Indonesia where citizens would have the freedom to 
have no religious faith. His vision of Indonesia was one of “humanity” 
“consensus” “peace and safety” and “a belief in an all-encompassing 
and perfect God”.43  While his approach was conciliatory and inclusive, 
it apparently left no room for atheism or agnosticism, and effectively 
created a state-mandated belief in God which was compulsory for all 
citizens of the new republic. This compulsory belief in God, albeit with 
“freedom of religion”, was reinforced in the national Constitution.   
The Indonesian Constitution 
The Preamble to the Indonesian Constitution states “the 
independence of Indonesia shall be formulated into a Constitution of 
the Republic of Indonesia which shall be built into a sovereign state 
                                                 
42 Ibid., p. 102. 
43 Ibid. 
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based on a belief in the One and Only God”.44 It goes on to restate, in 
full, the remaining tenets of the Pancasila, thus enshrining them, in 
principle, into constitutional law.  
Article 28E(1) states “Every person shall be free to choose and to 
practice the religion of his/her choice...(2) Every person shall have the 
right to the freedom to believe his/her faith (kepercayaan) and to 
express his/her views and thoughts, in accordance with his/her 
conscience. (3) Every person shall have the right to the freedom to 
associate, to assemble and to express opinions.  
Article 28I(1) states “The rights to life, freedom from torture, 
freedom of thought and conscience, freedom of religion, freedom from 
enslavement, recognition as a person before the law, and the right not 
to be tried under a law with retrospective effect are all human rights that 
cannot be limited under any circumstances.45 (2) Every person shall have the 
right to be free from discriminative treatment based upon any grounds 
whatsoever and shall have the right to protection from such 
discriminative treatment. 
Chapter XI Religion, states at article 29 (1) The State shall be based 
upon the belief in the One and Only God. (2) The state guarantees all 
persons the freedom of worship, each according to his/her own 
religion or belief.  
The Indonesian Constitution therefore, in articles 28E, 28I and 29 
contains no less than four separate guarantees of freedom of religion, 
faith or belief, as well as protections from any kind of discriminative 
treatment, and to express opinions or beliefs.  
However, the Constitution also states in the Preamble and article 
29 that the Indonesian state is based on a belief in the One and Only 
God. Therein lies a paradox. Freedom of religion, faith, belief or 
conscience, must include the freedom to have no religion, faith, belief 
or conscience. If a person cannot be compelled to believe or convert 
to a particular one of the belief systems, how can a person be compelled 
to believe in any of them? It is tantamount to saying, while we 
guarantee that you cannot be forced to believe in a, b, c or d, you can 
be forced to believe in one of them, and you must choose one. This is a 
logical absurdity which is not adequately addressed by Indonesia’s 
                                                 
44 Indonesian Constitution 1945 Preamble.  
45 Emphasis added. 
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Constitution or legislation.46 In fact, Indonesia’s Law No. 1 of 1965 
compounds the absurdity by limiting the number of state-recognised 
religions to six: Islam, Catholicism, Protestantism, Hinduism, 
Buddhism and Confucianism.  
Art 28J(2) of the Constitution also states that the rights and 
freedoms are subject to the “restrictions established by law for the sole 
purposes of guaranteeing the recognition and respect of the rights and 
freedoms of others and to satisfying just demands based upon 
considerations of morality, religious values, security and public order in 
a democratic society”. As stated below, Indonesia’s Constitutional 
Court placed great signficance on this section in upholding the 
Blasphemy Law of 1965 which was challenged for being 
unconstitutional insofar as it limits the freedom of religion principles 
outlined above. 
Law No. 1 of 1965 on Blasphemy 
Law No. 1 of 1965 on the Prevention of the Abuse of Religion 
and/or Blasphemy (hereinafter ‘the Blasphemy Law’) is the most often 
cited and most visible state apparatus for limiting individual religious 
freedom, and the religious plurality of Indonesian society. It has been 
the subject of an unsuccessful Constitutional Court challenge.47 The 
Blasphemy Law, which contains only four succinct articles, prohibits 
anyone from “publicly deliberately speaking about, recommending, or 
lending support to interpretations of a religion which deviate from the 
central teachings of that religion” (Article1). Where an individual 
commits such an offence, they are to be given a warning by joint letter 
issued by the Minister of Religion, the Attorney General and the 
Minister of Internal Affairs (article 2(1)). Where an organisation or 
                                                 
46 Interestingly, art 9(1) of the Indonesian Constitution allows Presidents and Vice 
Presidents the option of swearing a religious oath, or a non-religious affirmation which 
contains no reference to God. This appears to allow Presidents and VPs a liberty 
which is not extended to other citizens; for example when giving testimony in legal 
proceedings individuals are required to be sworn in according to their religion. In the 
Blasphemy Case, one witness who asked to be sworn in using, not the words of any of 
the six officially sanctioned religions, but the Pancasila, was told by the Chief Judge of 
the Constitional Court that “there is no such thing as swearing by the Pancasila.” 
Indonesian Legal Resource Center (ed), Bukan Jalan Tengah: Eksaminasi Publik Putusan 
Mahkamah Konstitusi Perihal Pengujian Undang-Undang Nomor 1 PNPS Tahun 1965 Tentang 
Penyalahgunaan dan/atau Penodaan Agama (2010), p. 14. 
47 Ibid. 
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‘aliran kepercayaan’ (sect) commits an offence, the President may 
disband and ban the group (article 2(2)). If, after the warning, the 
individual or group continues to offend against article 1, the 
individuals, followers, members or leaders of the organisation may be 
imprisoned for up to five years (article 3). Article 4 of the law inserts 
an article into the Criminal Code, article 156a, to give effect to the 
provisions set out above. In full, article 4 states: 
A punishment of up to five years imprisonment shall be applied to 
any person who, in public, expresses an opinion or an action: (a) 
Which is characterised by enmity, abuse or blasphemy against a 
particular religion which is followed in Indonesia; (b) Which is 
intended so that others will not follow any religion, which is the 
basis of the principle of A Belief in the One and Almighty God.48 
By virtue of article 156a therefore, anyone who publicly espouses 
“deviant” interpretations of religion, or atheism, commits a criminal 
offence, punishable by up to five years imprisonment.  
President Soekarno signed the Blasphemy Law into existence as a 
Presidential Decree on 27 January 1965. It was only later, in 1969, that 
the Presidential Decree was elevated to the status of national 
legislation (undang-undang) through the enactment of Law No. 5 of 1969 
on the Enactment of Various Presidential Decrees as Legislation. The 
Blasphemy Law was among a tranche of 72 presidential decrees, made 
between the years 1959 and 1969, which were converted into 
legislation by Law No. 5 of 1969.  
The body of the Blasphemy Law itself contains no reference to the 
six religions which are famously ‘recognised’ by the Indonesian state. 
These passages are contained in the elucidation; the explanatory notes 
which come after the main articles of the law. 
Before proceeding to examine the contents of the elucidation it 
should be noted that the legal status of text contained in the 
elucidation may be questionable.49 Article 176 of Appendix I of Law 
No. 12 of 2011 on the Formulation of Legislation, states: 
176. The elucidation is the official interpretation, by the 
legislators, of certain norms in the body of the law. Therefore the 
                                                 
48 Author’s translation. 
49 Adi Condro Bawono, 'Fungsi Penjelasan dan Lampiran Peraturan Perundang-
undangan' (2012)  hukumonline  <http://www.hukumonline.com/klinik/detail/cl638-
6/fungsi-penjelasan-dan-lampiran-peraturan-perundang-undangan> 
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elucidation only contains a commentary/analysis/clarification 
(‘uraian’) of words, phrases and sentences.  
177. The elucidation may not be used as a legal basis for the 
formation of further regulations, and may not contain normative 
formulations. 
178. The elucidation may not use formulations which would 
import changes of meaning to the provisions of the legislation.50 
Appendix I of Law No. 12 of 2011 further states, at article 186, 
that “the elucidation may not conflict with, broaden, narrow, or add to 
the normative definition of provisions in the body of the law”. 
Essentially therefore, the elucidation should only provide an 
explanation of the text contained in the law and should not contain 
new substantive material which is not contained in the law itself. It is 
highly arguable that the bounds of what an elucidation is supposed to 
do have been stretched beyond breaking point in the case of the 
Blasphemy Law and its entire legal authority for limiting the practice of 
religion in Indonesia to six major recognised religions is highly 
questionable in term of legality. This question ought to be raised in the 
event of another constitutional challenge to the law.  
In the case of the Blasphemy Law, the elucidation contains the real 
substance and raison d’etre of the law itself. Note 1 restates the five 
principles of the Pancasila, followed by:  
As the first principle, a belief in the One and Almighty God does 
not only provide a moral basis for the state and the government, it 
also ensures national unity based on religion.  
Recognition of the first sila (Belief in the One and Almighty God) 
cannot be separated from religion, because it is one of the 
fundamental pillars of human existence and for the people of 
Indonesia it is also a principle of the state and an integral element 
in nation-building.  
The second note explains the reason that the law was enacted by 
President Soekarno, that is, that there was a burgeoning number51 of 
                                                 
50 Author’s translation. 
51 A report of Indonesia’s Department of Religion in 1953 stated that there were over 
360 religious sects in Java. The divergence of religious groups may have been a 
determinative factor in the failure of Islamic parties to achieve a majority at the 1955 
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sects and faiths, many of which diverged from the teachings of the 
large recognised religions. It states:  
In recent times, all over Indonesia, a large number of sects, 
organizations and beliefs have emerged in the community, which 
conflict with religious teachings and laws.  
Among those teachings and activities followers of those 
sects/beliefs which contravene law, and threaten national unity 
and blaspheme against religion... the growth of such organisations 
is extremely dangerous for existing religions.  
The article-by-article elucidation, with regard to article 1 of the 
Blasphemy Law states: 
Religions which are followed by Indonesian citizens are Islam, 
Christianity, Catholicism, Hinduism, Buddhism and Khong Hu Cu 
(Confucianism).  
This is proven by the historical development of religions in 
Indonesia. 
Because these six religions are followed by almost all of 
Indonesia’s citizens...they receive the assistance and protections 
[as set out in article 1]. 
This does not mean that other religions, such as Judaism, 
Zoroastrianism, Shintoism, Taoism, are forbiddden in Indonesia. 
They receive the full protection of article 29(2) [of the 
Constitution] and their existence is allowed (“dibiarkan adanya”), as 
long as they do not contravene the provisions set out in this law 
or other laws.  
With regard to other sects/beliefs, the government should take 
steps to channel these into a healthy belief which is in line with 
Belief in the One and Almighty God.52 
By mandating criminal sanctions for any person who publicly 
professes beliefs “which deviate from the fundamental teachings of a 
particular religion” it then becomes encumbent on the state to 
determine and adjudicate what are the normative teachings of each of 
those recognised religions – which the Indonesian authority has done 
                                                                                                      
election.  The Blasphemy Law was therefore an attempt by Soekarno to balance the 
competing forces of nationalism, religion and communism. Center, above n , p. 1.  
52 Author’s translation. 
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through the Ministry of Religion. While other established religions 
such as Judaism were expressly “allowed” to exist, other indigenous 
beliefs and sects were urged to be “guided” into line with the national 
philosophy of belief in one God. This effectively meant that they 
would be placed under the umbrella heading of one of the recognised 
religions, or, criminalised.  
Constitutional Court Challenge to the Blasphemy Law  
In 2010, a number of community organisations banded together 
and mounted a challenge to the Blasphemy Law in Indonesia’s 
Constitutional Court.53 The case received a great deal of public 
attention and heard evidence from dozens of expert witnesses. Hard 
line religious groups such as FPI and GARIS attended the trial, 
demonstrated and even intimidated witnesses who were in favour of 
repealing the Blasphemy Law. Witnesses in favour of repealing the law 
were equated with being atheists, communists and satan worshippers54 
through intimidating chanting and threats. Several witnesses were 
threatened with death, and shouts that to spill their blood would be 
“halal” (permissable under Islamic law).55  
In its final decision, the Constitutional Court, in a majority 8-1 
decision rejected the application to repeal the Blasphemy Law as 
unconstitutional. Its decision was based, on two main arguments, first, 
that the Blasphemy Law must be viewed in an Indonesian context. It 
stated:  
Indonesia’s recognition of international law, including human 
rights, must still be based on the philosophy and Constitution of 
the Unitary Republic of Indonesia. As such, Indonesia’s 
administrative law does not have to equate with rechstaat, the rule 
of law, individualism or communalism.56  
The wording seems quite clearly to argue that, while Indonesia is a 
signatory to international declarations of human, civil and political 
rights, that the provisions of those international laws must be viewed 
through the prism of Indonesian-ness, and discarded to the extent of 
any conflict.  
                                                 
53 Ibid. 
54 Ibid., p. 27. 
55 Ibid., pp. 29-35. 
56 Ibid., p. 39. 
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Second, the judgement was based on the argument that freedom of 
religion is not an absolute freedom, and that it must be limited in order 
to maintain harmony and order. The Constitutional basis of this 
argument derives from art 28J(2) of the Constitution which allows the 
restrictions on freedoms for the purposes of “public order”. This 
argument basically says that allowing freedom of religion, or the 
freedom to reinterpret religious tenets, can be the source of 
disagreement, offence, hatred, horizontal violence (between groups), 
vertical violence (between groups and the state) and, taken to its 
extreme, anarchy. The case of the Ahmadiyah is a classic example of a 
group which has reinterpreted religious texts, caused offence to other 
religious groups, which led to violence. This line of reasoning however 
does not recognise that allowing the “fundamental teachings” of 
religions to be set by a governmental body, reinforces the self-
righteousness and intolerant thinking of those who follow the 
mainstream ‘state-endorsed’ belief system. When the MUI issued a 
fatwa on the deviant Ahmadiyah sect, it was taken as a ‘green light’ on 
the part of hard-line groups to persecute the minority sect which had 
been officially ‘outed’.57 
Finally, as Tim Lndsey and Helen Pausacker observe with regard 
to the Blasphemy Law, it can be noted that the use of the law in the 
Post-Soeharto era is increasing:   
The post-Soeharto application of the Criminal Code dealing with 
religion shows two clear features: first, increased use overall, and, 
second, a heavy focus on the repression of relatively minor 
unorthodox sects. Typically these are characterised as ‘deviant’ 
and as implicit threats to state-sanctioned orthodox religious 
belief, to the extent that they seem also to be viewed  as 
subversive and a threat to the state itself, although this seems an 
absurd exaggeration of the ‘danger’ posed by the tiny, eccentric 
groups usually targeted.58 
The question of “orthodoxy” is usually determined by the 
conservative views of the MUI which means that “this organisation 
                                                 
57 Bernhard Platzdasch, 'Religious Freedom in Indonesia: The Case of the Ahmadiyah' 
(Institute of South East Asian Studies, 2011) <http://web1.iseas.edu.sg/wp-
content/uploads/2010/11/Religious-Freedom-in-Indonesia1.pdf> 
58 Tim Lindsey and Helen Pausacker, Religion, Law and Intolerance in Indonesia (Routledge, 
2016). 
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continues to accrue significant de facto power as a sort of informal 
religious police force.”59 Similar tactics are used to curtail larger deviant 
groups such as Ahmadiyah. “State action follows, or is accompanied 
by, condemnation by MUI or another conservative Muslim 
organisation and then violence – led by militant Islamist groups – that 
the state usually declines to punish. There is little hope of change in 
these patterns of state repression if the Criminal Code is amended or 
the current Religious Harmony draft bill passed, as the amendments 
currently proposed to both of these statutes would only make the 
position of minority groups even weaker.60 
However, there may be some hope for change. One out of the 
nine judges on Indonesia’s Constitutional Court bench, in a dissenting 
judgement, argued for the repeal of the Blasphemy Law, saying that it 
created inconsistent treatment between recognised religions, and other 
religions. Further, the judge stated that the government had entered 
into the murky waters of regulating matters of spirituality which were 
best left to the individual. And, that through various state mechanisms 
such as the issuing of identity cards, marriage and death certificates, the 
recognised religions were in a superior position to people who 
professed other beliefs, and that the criminal sanctions of the 
Blasphemy law had been applied arbitrarily. Due to the many 
inconsistencies and unfairness which the Blasphemy Law creates, the 
judge, Maria Farida, therefore agreed that it should be repealed. 
However, she was a minority of one out of nine. 
Anti-Communist Purge of 1965 
The timing of the Blasphemy Law of 1965 is signficant, and must 
be viewed in the historical context of a global ‘cold war’, and responses 
to the expansion of communism. Following Indonesia’s declaration of 
Independence in 1945, recalling that in formulating the Pancasila 
Soekarno placed particular emphasis on the teachings of Sun Yat Sen, 
Soekarno’s relations with ethnic Chinese Indonesians, and with China 
itself, were good. While this is a complex period of history with many 
conflicting accounts, what is clear is that Soekarno’s connections with 
Communist China, and the growing influence and strength of the 
Indonesian Communist Party (Partai Komunis Indonesia, the ‘PKI’) 
                                                 
59 Ibid. 
60 Ibid.  
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culminated in a set of events on 30 September 1965 which altered the 
course of Indonesia’s history – and led to Soeharto’s gradual take-over 
of power from President Soekarno. A nation-wide massacre of 
suspected communists took place in the years 1965/6 which is 
unprecedented in Indonesian history. Estimates vary, but anywhere 
between 500,000 to 3,000,000 people were murdered in a bloodbath 
which spilled over into many of the islands of the archipelago. The 
massacre was also accompanied with a wide-spread campaign to rid 
Indonesia of all Chinese influence, including by banning Chinese 
characters, newspapers, names, associations and so on. A former 
Chinese-Singaporean diplomat gave a succinct account of this 
transformation in Indonesian history: 
The Suharto regime closed down all Chinese schools, banned all 
Chinese newspapers and did not even allow Chinese characters to 
be displayed in Indonesia... I remember when I first visited Jakarta 
and Bandung in 1955 during the Afro-Asian Conference that there 
were still Chinese signboards everywhere. Chinese newspapers 
fought out their Chinese ideological war on Indonesian soil and 
Chinese schools could be seen in every village. When I visited 
Indonesia again in 1960 with Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew to see 
President Sukarno, there were still Chinese newspapers and 
Chinese schools and Chinese signboards. But when I went to 
Indonesia to present credentials to President Suharto, there were 
no more Chinese signboards nor any Chinese associations or 
schools or newspapers. Not only was the Chinese language 
considered “harmful”, but even Chinese religion and customs 
were regarded as undesirable... In 1967 a Presidential instruction 
stated that Chinese religion, beliefs and customs...might generate 
unnatural influence on the psychology, mentality and morality of 
Indonesian citizens and impede prosperity... Since the Indonesian 
state ideology, the Pancasila, included “Belief in God” as the first 
principle, every person in Indonesia was expected to have a 
religion of some kind.61   
In the context of resisting the global expansion of communism, 
the involvement of the US in Indonesia’s affairs cannot be ignored, 
and arguably played a crucial role in the annihilation of communism, 
and the acute stigmatisation of atheism, in Indonesia. A report in the 
                                                 
61 Khoon Choy Lee, A Fragile Nation: the Indonesian Crisis (World Scientific, 2010) 
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Washington Post in 1990 outlined US involvement in “one of the 
century’s worst massacres” stating: 
U.S. officials 25 years ago supplied the names of thousands of 
members of the Indonesian Communist Party to the army in 
Jakarta, which at the time was hunting down the leftists and killing 
them in a crackdown branded as one of the century's worst 
massacres, former U.S. diplomats and CIA officials say. 
For the first time, the officials are acknowledging that they 
systematically compiled comprehensive lists of communist 
operatives, from the top echelons down to village cadres in 
Indonesia, the world's fifth most populous nation. As many as 
5,000 names were furnished over a period of months to the army 
there, and the Americans later checked off the names of those 
who had been killed or captured, according to the former U.S. 
officials. 
The assassinations were part of a massive bloodletting that 
decimated the Partai Komunis Indonesia (PKI) in Indonesia, a 
Southeast Asian archipelago of more than 13,500 islands. The PKI 
was the third-largest Communist Party in the world at the time, 
with 3 million members, and through affiliated organizations -- 
such as labor and youth groups -- it claimed the loyalties of 17 
million others.62 
The US, which was already in a protracted war against communism 
in Vietnam, saw Indonesia’s growing support of communism, both in 
the president and the populace, as a serious threat. Indonesia’s PKI, 
with 3 million members and the loyalty of 17 million more, 
represented a growing problem which needed to be dealt a decisive 
blow.  
The US-endorsed, Suharto-led military crackdown on Indonesia’s 
communist party, was so lethal, so ruthless and so complete, that the 
repercussions continued to be felt throughout the following decades, 
and to this day. In 2016, relatives of those killed in the 1965/6 
massacres, clearly still stigmatised, traumatised and intimidated by their 
                                                 
62 Kathy Kadane, 'US Officials lists aided Indonesian bloodbath in 60s' (1990)  The 
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us-officials-lists-aided-indonesian-bloodbath-in-60s/ff6d37c3-8eed-486f-908c-3eeafc-
19aab2/> 
  
Adam J. Fenton 
JOURNAL OF INDONESIAN ISLAM 
Volume 10, Number 02, December 2016 
206 
‘connection to communism’ sought, not to be able to reintroduce 
communism to Indonesia, but only some kind of reconciliation.63 
Haryono, spokesman of Lembaga Perjuangan Rehabilitasi Korban 
Orde Baru, an NGO working for the rehabilitation of New Order 
regime victims, said many people had become victims in the 1965 
killings, thus it was important for the government to extend an 
apology. 
“We don’t want to re-raise communism in Indonesia. We just ask 
the President to engage in reconciliation,” said Haryono.  
The National Commission on Human Rights (Komnas HAM) 
decided on July 23, 2012, that violence committed after the Sept. 
30, 1965, incident amounted to gross human rights violations... 
According to Komnas HAM, the number of those killed in the 
1965 anti-communist purge was somewhere between 500,000 and 
three million people.64 
Indonesia’s anti-communism, and therefore anti-atheism, remains 
so strong that in 2016, two Indonesian student activists wearing 
satirical T-shirts with the letters “PKI” – a play on words meaning 
“Indonesian Coffee Lover” – were detained by military authorities for 
“spreading communism through T-shirts”.65  
Conclusion 
A unique Pancasila-based religious orthodoxy exists in Indonesia. 
It states that, while citizens have a kind of religious freedom – the 
freedom to choose from six major state-recognised religions – it also 
states that citizens essentially must choose one, and any kind of 
religious activity or belief which goes beyond that is deeply 
questionable, and quite possibly criminal. This religious orthodoxy 
appears to be growing and is reinforced through many of the 
mechanisms mentioned in this paper: the growing influence of 
Indonesia’s quasi-governmental religious arbiter the MUI, the growth 
of Islamic-based regional regulations, the growth of prosecutions of 
‘deviant’ sects under the Blasphemy Law, residual anti-communist/-
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atheist prejudices from the events of the 1960s, Constitutional Court 
decisions which reinforce limitations on religious freedom, and the 
continued emphasis on the first tenet of Pancasila, a belief in God. It is 
unlikely, therefore, that Singer’s “unaccustomed mental switch” to “re-
think” our own most fundamental beliefs, is going to happen in 
Indonesia on any large scale, any time soon.  
When it was publicly revealed that one of Indonesia’s leading state 
universities was running an information and support campaign for 
LGBT students, it caused a massive backlash from religious and 
governmental institutions.66 Any movement of that kind towards 
recognising the legitimacy of alternative ideological viewpoints such as 
atheism or agnosticism would likely be met with the same swift and 
forceful resistance from Indonesia’s state and religious institutions. 
Still, a dissenting opinion by a judge of Constitutional Court on the 
Blasphemy Law proves there is still hope.  
The Indonesian state may have mandated a belief in God, and it 
may be able to legislate and criminalise people’s public expressions of 
faith, however, it cannot legislate thoughts. There are an unknown, but 
possibly growing, number of individuals and groups in Indonesia 
which espouse alternative ideologies and beliefs to those of the 
mainstream including, atheists, agnostics and LGBTs among others. 
They and other groups and NGOs which operate outside the 
mainstream exist and fight daily for equality of treatment for 
marginalised groups while treading a fine line between freedom of 
speech and prosecution. Further research is needed about the 
prevalence of these non-mainstream groups, and about how those in 
Indonesia’s scientific community engage with, and reconcile, their 
religious beliefs and scientific practices.  
Indonesia’s national motto, Bhinneka Tunggal Ika, is commonly 
translated as “unity in diversity”. It appears that, at present, the 
principle of “unity” trumps that of “diversity”. Indonesia’s 
advancement in, and global contribution to, science, pluralism and 
tolerance remains compromised while the prevailing and growing 
religious attitudes remain. Whether Indonesia is ready for a public 
debate about the “unaccustomed mental switch” which would allow a 
space in society for non-mainstream religious points of view including 
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indigenous belief systems as well as atheism67 and agnostism, remains 
doubtful.  
By mandating a belief in God, limiting the choices of legitimate 
state-recognised religions, and reinforcing institutionalised bias, the 
Indonesian state is perpetuating attitudes of religious righteousness, 
bigotry and intolerance towards religious and ideological minorities. 
This position, which is purposely designed to maintain a national status 
quo in religious affairs, inadvertently hampers counter-narratives aimed 
at jihadist and radical Islamist ideologies–as well as any kind of 
innovative thought which challenges inherited belief structures. The 
role of Indonesia’s secondary and tertiary education systems in 
producing graduates who are able to think critically, and innovate 
when necessary, will be key to the country’s ability to compete 
effectively in an increasingly integrated global community.[] 
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